Ari Shavit at Haaretz offers a powerful, palpably traumatic glimpse back to the 2006 Lebanon War II, as viewed through the lens a government commission of inquiry report, to determine its causes, and national and strategic implications:
"In the summer of 2006, before crushing Hezbollah, Israel was humiliated. In the Middle East, the implication of humiliation is not just emotional but strategic. When the ocean is seething with sharks, the dolphin must not bleed or project weakness. In the past few months, the Hezbollah offensive led to the Israeli dolphin bleeding and projecting weakness. The bleeding and weakness will haunt us in the years ahead and tempt various sharks to attack us again and again. Therefore, despite the successful conclusion of the IDF operation in Lebanon, the commission has no choice but to state that the events of the past summer were indeed a blunder.Well worth a careful reading.
"Underlying the blunder of 1973 was the political conception of the status quo. The baseless belief that Israel's power allowed it to ignore its surroundings and shape its destiny as it wished. In contrast, underlying the blunder of 2006 was the political conception of unilateralism. The baseless belief that Israel's power enables it to ignore its surroundings and shape its destiny as it wishes."
(Hat tip to Blogs of Zion)